A bilattice is a set equipped with two partial orders and a negation operation that inverts one of them while leaving the other unchanged; it has been suggested that the truth values used by inference systems should be chosen from such a structure instead of the two-point set ft; fg. Given such a choice, we rede ne a modal operator to be a function on the bilattice selected. We show that this de nition generalizes both Kripke's possible worlds approach and Moore's autoepistemic logic, and also use recent developments in the formalization of logic programs to construct a procedure for determining the truth value of a sentence when the underlying knowledge base involves modal operators of this form.
Introduction
Modal operators are used in a variety of ways in AI, including reasoning about knowledge and belief, about time, and applications to nonmonotonic inference 11, 15, 13, and others]. The semantics assigned to a particular modal operator are usually determined using a scheme due to Kripke 12] that is based on the notion of possible worlds linked by an accessibility relation. Moore, however, needs to de ne his own semantics in 13] in order to establish the desired link between a modal operator of knowledge and existing ideas in nonmonotonic reasoning.
The purpose of this paper is to show that Moore's and Kripke's ideas can be uni ed into a single approach if we view modal operators not in terms of possible worlds, but as mappings on the truth values assigned to various sentences. Thus the modal operator L, where Lp means, \I know that p," simply assigns the truth value true to Lp if p is known to be true, and assigns Lp the value false if p is either known to be false or is not known to be true or false (i.e., if p is not known to be true).
The approach we are proposing is made possible by the fact that we will work with a formal system that explicitly allows us to label sentences with values other than the conventional ones of true and false. The description in the previous paragraph, for example, implicitly took advantage of a potential label for p that indicated that it was \unknown" in that it was not known to be either true or false.
In Section 2, we discuss the mathematical ideas underlying this approach, where truth values are taken not from the two-point set ft; fg but instead from a larger set known as a bilattice. Section 3 extends these ideas as we have suggested, formally de ning a modal operator to be a function on the elements of the bilattice of truth values.
Section 4 contains a variety of mathematical results. We show that our approach has analogs to the modal operators used by Kripke and by Moore, although the proof that we generalize their constructions is delayed until Section 6. We also present some results regarding modal operators generally, showing that Moore's L operator cannot be expressed in terms of conventional logical connectives but that it, in combination with Kripke-style modal operators, can be used to generate all possible modal operators on any bilattice corresponding to monotonic reasoning. In Section 5, we set the stage for proving that we have generalized Kripke's and Moore's work by extending our de nition of inference to truth functions that involve modal operators. Finally, in Section 6 we return our attention to Moore's construction, showing that his notion of groundedness can be translated naturally into our setting. Section 6 also contains our fundamental unifying results, showing that rst-order logic, Kripke's work and Moore's construction are all special cases of our general approach.
Section 7 discusses the construction of an automated theorem prover that handles modal operators of the sort we have de ned. The principal observation made in this section is that it is possible to extend to our more general setting existing work on strati cation 1, 7, 6, 5] that can be used to compute the consequences of some autoepistemic theories.
Finally, concluding remarks and suggestions for future work are the topic of Section 8.
One especially promising feature of the work that we will present is that it allows us to de ne modal operators that accept more than a single sentence as an argument. This may allow us to develop precise formalizations of notions such as causality; applications to temporal reasoning are also discussed.
In the interests of maintaining the continuity of the exposition, all proofs have been relegated to an appendix.
Mathematical preliminaries
In 9], a mathematical structure called a bilattice was introduced. Essentially, a bilattice is a set equipped with two partial orders and a negation operation that inverts one of them while leaving the other unchanged:
De nition 2.1 A bilattice is a sextuple (B;^; _; ; +; :) such that: A bilattice will be called distributive if the bilattice operations^, _, and + distribute with respect to one another.
It is suggested in 9] that bilattices are natural objects to use in arti cial intelligence applications, since the elements of the bilattice can be thought of as \truth values" labelling the statements in a declarative database. The two partial orders represent how much condence we have in the validity of a particular sentence, and how much information we have about it. These ideas are expanded on considerably in 9] and have recently been explored by Fitting as well 3].
The two partial orders associated with a bilattice are denoted by t and k . The partial order t re ects how certain we are that some sentence is valid, and corresponds to the lattice operations^and _. The partial order k is concerned with the amount of knowledge we have about a proposition, and is associated with the lattice operations and +. The fact that negation inverts the t partial order is the representation of de Morgan's laws in our setting; negation leaves the k partial order unchanged because we know more about a sentence p than about a sentence q if and only if we know more about :p than about :q.
Diagrammatically, we can draw a bilattice so that the partial order t increases from left to right on the page, and the partial order k from the bottom of the page to the top. Thus, for example, the simplest nontrivial bilattice is as depicted in Figure 1 . This is the bilattice that corresponds most closely to conventional rst-order reasoning. The four elements of this bilattice are used to label sentences that are known to be true (t) or false (f), about which indicates the presence of a contradiction in our declarative database.) Larger bilattices also contain the four distinguished elements t, f, ? and u, these being the maximal and minimal elements of the two partial orders t and k .
In 9], bilattices are also discussed that correspond to assumption-based truth maintenance systems (atms's) and default reasoning; in 10], this work is extended to a bilattice that can often be used to determine whether or not a given sentence follows from the circumscription axiom.
In the setting suggested by this approach, a declarative database consists of a mapping from the set W of the well-formed sentences in our logical language into a xed bilattice B:
De nition 2.2 A truth assignment is a mapping : W ! B.
In practice, most of the sentences in W will be mapped to u (unknown) .
Of course, these ideas are of little use without an associated notion of inference. The one we will present is modelled on that used in rst-order logic, where one rst gives conditions under which a subset U W is deductively closed, and then de nes the deductive closure of a set S as:
cl(S) \ fT jT S and T is deductively closedg:
(1) The multivalued analog of a closed set is a closed truth assignment:
De nition 2.3 A truth assignment will be called closed if:
3. If p j= q, then (q) t (p).
The motivation behind this de nition is as follows: Condition (1) says that we should know at least as much about a conjunction as we could conclude by conjoining the truth values assigned to the various conjuncts. (2) says that the two views of negation { as a syntactic operator on our language and as a bilattice function { are equivalent, and (3) says that if p entails q, then q should be \at least as true" as p is.
The reason that condition (1) does not read
can be seen by considering the sentence p^:p, where the truth value assigned to p is u (unknown). Now condition (2) says that the truth value assigned to :p should be u as well (since if we know nothing about p, then we also know nothing about its negation), and the constraint given by (2) would incorrectly lead us to assign u to p^:p as well.
The truth value assigned to p^:p is instead determined by conditions (2) and (3). Speci cally, if q is any sentence with (q) = t, then since q j= :(p^:p), we know from condition (3) that (:(p^:p)) t t; so that (:(p^:p)) = t, and therefore by condition (2) that (p^:p) = f.
To construct an analog to (1), we need a bilattice version of the set-inclusion relation among subsets of W. Here it is:
De nition 2.4 Let and be two truth assignments. If (p) k (p) for all p 2 W, we will write k and say that is an extension of . The de nition given by (1) now generalizes as follows:
The bilattice product operation is the multivalued analog to set intersection; the condition that be an extension of is the analog to the requirement that T S in (1) . To see that this is a reasonable de nition, consider once again the four-point bilattice F appearing in Figure 1 . If we x a set of sentences S W, we can de ne an associated truth assignment S by:
S (p) = t; if p 2 S; u; otherwise.
Essentially, this is the truth assignment that \knows" the sentences in S but nothing else. What we have done in (6) and other expressions like it is to realize that conjunction plays two distinct roles in the approach we have proposed. The rst role is as a binary function from our bilattice of truth values to itself; the second is as a binary operator on the set W of well-formed sentences in our language.
We will take the view that this is in fact a special case of a much more general phenomenon { bilattice operations can be viewed in general as establishing semantic meanings for their syntactic counterparts. These syntactic counterparts are generally referred to as modal operators; we de ne a modal operator to be instead the associated function on the underlying bilattice:
De nition 3.4 A modal operator is any n-ary function from the bilattice B to itself. Given a set M of modal operators, we de ne the extended language W M to be the smallest set satisfying the following properties: The usual description of modal operators is originally due to Kripke 12] , and is based on the notion of possible worlds. Roughly speaking, Kripke considers a set of possible worlds in which all of the sentences in the unextended language are assigned truth values of t or f. These possible worlds are related via an accessibility relation a, and Kripke de nes a modal operator L a by saying that L a (p) holds in a particular world w if and only if p holds in all worlds accessible from w.
One way to formalize this (although not the conventional one) is to introduce a function that takes a sentence p and a world w and returns the truth value of p in w. The condition de ning the modal operator L a is now that (L a p; w) =ŵ 0 (p; w 0 );
where the conjunction is taken over the set of all w 0 with a(w; w 0 ) (in other words, the set of all w 0 accessible from w). The semantics of the modal operator are then determined by the requirement that the truth values assigned by satisfy (9) in addition to the usual restrictions associated with the classical logical connectives. Of course, (9) bears a striking resemblance to our earlier equation (8) that was also intended to describe a semantics for modal operators. To make this observation precise, suppose that we denote by S the set of possible worlds appearing in the Kripke construction. F S , the set of functions from S to F, now inherits a bilattice structure from the set F, where the bilattice operations are computed pointwise and the assignment of the function g to a sentence p means that the truth value taken by p at the world w is given by g(w).
We can now capture the sense of (9) by xing an accessibility relation a and de ning the modal operator (i.e., bilattice function) given by:
where the conjunction, as in (9), is taken over all worlds w 0 with a(w; w 0 ).
Autoepistemic reasoning
Of course, Kripke is not the only author to consider modal operators. Moore, for example, formalizes in 13] a modal operator L, where Lp is intended to capture the notion of, \I know that p." This is related to the following unary mapping on the bilattice F:
L(x) = t; if x = t or x = ?; f; otherwise. We know p if its truth value is either t of ? (if the latter, we know p to be both true and false), and do not know p if its truth value is either f or u.
In Section 5, we will see that once we have extended De nition 2.3 to deal with general modal operators, the redescriptions that we have given of Kripke's and Moore's de nitions do indeed generalize this earlier work. Before doing so, however, we develop some general results concerning the form of modal operators on distributive bilattices.
Characterization results
The principal result of this section is Theorem 4.8, where we show that every modal operator on a distributive bilattice can be expressed in terms of conventional logical connectives, Moore's L operator, and a set of operators that we will call projections.
As a preliminary, we have the following:
Proposition 4.1 The L operator on the bilattice F cannot be written in terms of the existing bilattice functions^, _, , + and : de ned on F.
In other words, the L operator is legitimately distinct from those that have already been de ned on the bilattice F. This explains why the semantics of autoepistemic logic cannot be captured by the existing methods of rst-order reasoning. Proposition 4.2 Every modal operator on the bilattice F can be written as a combination of the operators^, :, + and L, and the constant function u.
As the upshot of the previous proposition was that the L operator cannot be written in terms of the existing logical connectives, the upshot of Proposition 4.2 is that no additional operators are needed, at least on the bilattice F.
For larger bilattices, there are additional possibilities. On the bilattice F S , for example, there is a modal operator that assigns to the world j the truth values corresponding to the world i (corresponding to the accessibility relation a ij where world i is accessible from world j and no other worlds are accessible at all). In terms of (10), we have L a ij (g)(w) = g(i); if w = j; t; otherwise. It will be more convenient if rewrite this as L a ij (g) = ij (g) + c j ; where c j is given by c j (g)(w) = u; if w = j; t; otherwise and ij (g)(k) = g(i); if k = j; u; otherwise.
We also make the following de nition:
De nition 4.3 Let B be an arbitrary bilattice. We de ne a modal operator L on B by taking L(x) =^fyjy k (x _ u) and y :y = ug (12) Lemma 4.4 L and L S coincide on F S . Lemma 4.5 Any modal operator on F S can be written in terms of^, :, +, L, constant functions and the various ij appearing in (11) for i; j 2 S. In general, of course, the bilattice being used in a particular application may not be of the form F S for any set S. To deal with these situations, we need to generalize the modal operators ij appearing in (11 To formalize this distinction, we will split the set of modal operators on a particular bilattice B into deductive and nondeductive subsets. The intention is that we treat the deductive modal operators as Kripke corresponding to multiple copies of the four-point bilattice, we want to say that a \model" should label a sentence as being true or false in each copy of F. Thus for the bilattice F 2 , we require (p) 2 f(t; t); (t; f); (f; t); (f; f)g: (13) What characterizes the four bilattice points appearing in (13) is that they cannot be extended in the k direction without introducing some element of contradiction into the truth value that they represent. We formalize this as follows:
De nition 5.4 An element x of a bilattice will be called complete if x :x = u but for any element y > k x, y :y 6 = u.
We are now in a position to give a de nition of a model. Recalling our observation that the truth values assigned to sentences generated by nondeductive modal operators should not be determined by appealing to the truth values taken on models, we begin with the following:
De nition 5.5 A truth assignment will be called prestable if k f for every deductive modal operator f. We will say that is grounded if it is grounded for the set of nondeductive modal operators.
We now can nally replace the expression appearing in (3) An immediate outgrowth of these results is that we can use our description to simultaneously provide a semantics for Kripke-style and autoepistemic modal operators.
Implementation
The formal description contained in (17) is, unfortunately, not suitable for use in an automated theorem prover. In the autoepistemic case, however, there is a fairly wide class of databases known as strati ed 1, 7, 5] for which e cient computational procedures exist. This idea has an analog in our setting.
De nition 7.1 Let be a truth assignment. We will say that a sentence p 2 ) for each i. In this case, we will say that s is a strati cation of .
The intent of the de nition is to capture the sense in which we need to establish the truth value of one sentence before we can attempt to evaluate the truth value of another. Thus, for example, if assigns the truth value t to the sentence La b; then the de nition tells us that s(La) = s(b) and that s(a) < s(La). In other words, the truth values of b and of La need to be determined simultaneously, and they need to be determined after we have decided what truth value will ultimately be assigned to a.
The point of the de nition is that if a truth assignment is strati ed, we can evaluate the closure by working our way \up" the ordering given by s. The An examination of the proof of Theorem 7.2 shows that to compute the truth value in cl( i+1 ) of some sentence p with s(p) = i + 1, we should compute the truth values assigned to all of the relevant sentences in cl( i ), evaluate the truth values of nondeductive functional expressions by applying the appropriate modal operator to the sentences involved, and then compute the truth value of p using conventional logical techniques. This is very like the approach taken by prolog, where various auxiliary proof e orts are undertaken in order to compute the value to be assigned to a negated subgoal.
Any-time declarativism
An interesting property of the approach we are presenting is that it is possible to suspend these auxiliary proof e orts at any time, and to estimate the truth value to be assigned to some sentence in cl( i ). Having done so, we can continue to apply the modal operator to evaluate the truth value of p; this gives us a notion of \approximate" inference that can be used if computational resources are limited.
As an example, consider the following simple logic program: 
Suppose that we are interested in determining whether or not Tweety ies. Backward chaining, we discover that in order to determine the truth value assigned to this statement in cl( 2 ), we need to decide whether or not Tweety is abnormal, as indicated by cl( 1 ). The index always decreases, since the program is strati ed.
What is happening here is that we are constructing cl( 2 ) incrementally from cl( 1 ). If our original logic program had more strati cation levels, we would be computing cl( n ) from cl( n?1 ), which would in turn be computed from cl( n?2 ) and so on, until we reduced the original query to the problem of determining the truth values assigned to various sentences by cl( 1 ), which could be calculated from the truth assignment 1 itself.
If we wish, we can terminate this computation early by assuming that cl( i ) = i . In our simple example, where we need to determine the truth value assigned by cl( 1 ) to ab(Tweety), we can approximate this truth value by 1 ab(Tweety)] = u in order to estimate the impact of (19) on our belief that Tweety can y. What this approach does is allow us to \jump" to the conclusion that Tweety ies without fully examining the proof tree involved.
An alternative, of course, is to avoid the approximation and to call the theorem prover recursively to evaluate cl( 1 ) ab(Tweety)]:
In this particular case, there is no information to the e ect that Tweety is abnormal, and we draw the same conclusion as in the previous paragraph. However, had our database also included the facts that ostriches are abnormal and that Tweety is an ostrich, there would have been a di erence between the two approaches, since the approximate version would have concluded :Lab(Tweety) without checking the consistency of this assumption. These ideas can be used to give an \any-time" avor to the declarative approach that we have described. At any given point in the inference process, the analysis will have proceeded to some strati cation level i, and will be attempting to determine the truth values assigned by cl( i ) to various sentences in our language. If we have exhausted the computational resources allocated to solving the declarative problem in question, we can approximate cl( i ) by i and return an approximate answer immediately.
Relationship to the standard de nition
It is important to realize that the de nition of strati cation given by De nition 7.1 is somewhat weaker than the usual one. To see why, consider the following logic program: . This is a consequence of the fact that the logic programming community views this rule as a way to draw conclusions about a only. If we somehow knew that a was false (which is actually impossible given the syntactic restrictions generally placed on logic programs), we would like to be able to conclude that b was false as well, but this conclusion would not be a consequence of the usual interpretation of the logic program. This is in fact the reason that we view the above program as nonstrati ed. Upon learning that a is false, we will be forced to simultaneously assign truth values to both b and Lb, and the fact that program is not strati ed re ects the di culties to which this simultaneous assignment may lead.
It is interesting to note, however, that although the program we are considering is not strati ed according to our de nition, the algorithm corresponding to Theorem 7.2 will nevertheless give the correct answer if it is applied to the corresponding truth assignment. The reason for this is that the sentence b a, which potentially e ects the truth value of b, is equivalent to :a :b;
and can therefore only have the e ect of changing the truth value assigned to b from u to f. Since the modal operator L maps both of these points into the same value (namely f), we are justi ed in assigning Lb the value f and concluding a from this. There are other situations where this idea can be applied. Consider the following logic program, which is not strati ed according to even the usual de nition:
The truth values to be assigned to c and d cannot be determined, but we are nonetheless entitled to conclude a from :Lb.
What is happening here is that the interpretation of L as a bilattice function allows us to take advantage of the fact that the eventual response to the query a is insensitive to the question of whether b is assigned the truth value f or u and of whether c or d is true, provided that it is assigned one or the other of these values. This is quite similar to Van Gelder's description of the semantics of logic programs in terms of alternating xed points, where he sanctions all conclusions that can be shown to hold independent of the eventual resolution of declarative loops such as that appearing in the above program. Van Gelder's approach remains distinct from ours, however, since (as mentioned at the beginning of this section) he lacks a true negation operator, and interprets a rule such as a :-b as fundamentally \about" a and not about b.
These restrictions on Van Gelder's approach appear to us to be di culties with his ideas; having accepted them, however, he is able to show that every logic program has a well-de ned alternating xed-point semantics; we have no result indicating under precisely what circumstances the algorithm we have presented does indeed compute the closure of an arbitrary truth assignment.
Conclusion and future work
The purpose of this paper has been to argue that modal operators are best thought of not in terms of Kripke's possible-worlds construction, but as functions on the bilattice of truth values being used in any particular application. The technical content of the paper has been to show that this approach generalizes both the possible worlds work and Moore's autoepistemic logic, and to show that it is frequently possible to compute the results of a modal theory using slight generalizations of existing ideas from logic programming.
Extensions

Causality
The real value of our ideas, however, is not in their ability to combine existing notions under a single formal framework, but to extend them. As an immediate example, we have already noted that the work in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 will allow us to de ne modal operators that combine the features of Kripke's and of Moore's.
More interesting, however, is the fact that our construction does not inherit the possibleworlds construction's limitation to unary modal operators. If we write p > q for \p causes q," this suggests that it may be possible to interpret > as a binary modal operator on its arguments.
This idea is lent support by recent work of G ardenfors 4], where it is suggested that causal and explanatory reasoning can be understood in terms of probabilistic manipulations on the truth values assigned to the sentences whose causal relationship is being investigated. In 14], it is argued that the power of G ardenfors's approach lies not with the probabilistic reasoning it uses, but with the idea that the causal relationship between p and q can be determined by examining the sets of assumptions needed to guarantee the truth of these two sentences. These assumptions can be recorded in a bilattice-based truth value 2 and the G ardenfors construction then reduces to the development of a modal operator of the sort we have discussed.
More speci cally, suppose that we say that a causes b provided that a and b are both true, and that in the nearest world where a fails, b would fail as well. 3 In order to formalize this, we will suppose that we have identi ed some set C of atms contexts, and that for a given sentence p, we know the truth value of p in each of these contexts, so that our bilattice is in fact given by F C . We will also assume the existence of a map n that accepts as arguments a set S of contexts and a particular context c and returns the context in S that is nearest to c. 4 It is now reasonable to say that p causes q in a context c if (p)(c) = t = (q)(c) (i.e., both p and q hold in c), and if q fails in n(c; (p) ?1 (f)), so that q fails in the context nearest to c among those in which p is false. In other words, (p > q)(c) = (p)(c)^ (q)(c)^: (q) n(c; (p) ?1 (f))]: In modal terms, we have x > y = x^y^:y n( ; x ?1 (f))]: Note that the general approach we have developed immediately assigns a semantics to this operator { and perhaps an implementation as well.
Temporal reasoning
Finally, we will sketch a possible application of our ideas to temporal reasoning problems. As with the discussion of causality in the previous section, this work should be viewed as preliminary.
One of the conventional approaches to temporal reasoning involves reifying the sentences in our language, so that in order to say that some sentence p holds at a time t, we actually write holds(p; t): (20) The term rei cation refers to the fact that we have had to make the sentence p an object of our language in order to include it under the scope of the holds relation.
It seems more natural instead to treat holds as a modal operator, although this raises the problem that we need to deal with the temporal variable appearing in (20) in some way. We will do this by replacing the bilattice B with which we are working with B T , where T is the set of time points in our temporal language. Thus we label a sentence not with an element of B, but with a function that gives its truth value as a function of time. Sentences with no temporal component are labelled by constant functions from T to B.
Having taken this view, how are we to express a causal rule such as holds(clear(b); t)^occurs(move(b; l); t) holds(loc(b; l); t + 1); (21) saying that we can relocate a block that is clear in the blocks world by moving it? The di culty arises because the conclusion of the above rule is temporally delayed relative to the premises.
In order to describe this in our setting, we need to introduce a modal operator that corresponds to temporal delay. Here it is:
(f)(t) = f(t + 1): is a modal operator that takes any truth value (i.e., function from T into B) and delays it by one time unit. We can now rewrite (21) in the compact form:
There are some di culties with this approach; for example, it is somewhat awkward to describe situations in which the amount of delay varies depending upon features of the situation at time t. It remains to be seen whether these di culties are o set by the advantages of the simplicity of (22) and the exibility resulting from the fact that rei cation is not needed by this approach.
Further work
The analysis appearing in Sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 is clearly extremely preliminary, and much more work needs to be done on these and other applications of the general ideas that this paper has presented.
In addition, work is needed on the implementation issues discussed in Section 7. If a particular database is strati ed, the results of that section can indeed be used to compute the closure. But what if the database is not strati ed? As we have seen, the procedure implicit in Theorem 7.2 can be applied in somewhat wider circumstances than those in the premise of the theorem, and the precise nature of these circumstances needs to be investigated. The idea of any-time declarativism clearly warrants further investigation as well.
In fact, this paper has only begun to investigate the ideas suggested by the approach we have presented. Indeed, this has been our intention { to describe the approach itself, to show that it generalizes a variety of existing notions including Kripke's and Moore's constructions, to argue that it admits computationally e cient implementations, to suggest novel ways in which it can be used to describe causal and temporal reasoning, and then to leave the hard work for others. Proof. All of the functions de ned on the rst-order bilattice distribute with respect to the bilattice operation , so that if g is any modal operator constructed from them, we will have g(u) = g(t f) = g(t) g(f): Proof. Since (12) can be evaluated component-wise, it su ces to prove the lemma for the rst-order bilattice F. The result of evaluating (12) for the various elements of F is: Proof. It is shown in 9] that any distributive bilattice B can be embedded in a bilattice of the form F S for some S. Suppose, then, that we have embedded B in F S and extended the given modal operator to all of F S in an arbitrary way, obtaining the function f by doing so. It follows from the previous two lemmas that f can be written in terms of^, :, +, L, constant functions and projections.
There are two things that might prevent this reexpression from applying to the bilattice B F S . The rst is that the projections used might map B into elements of F S outside of B itself; the second is that the operator L may be di erent when viewed as an operator on B and on F S .
For the rst of these, note that we only need in (26) that there be \enough" projections for us to construct the various -functions.
In general, suppose that we have a set of injections fi k g from F into B such that any element of B can be written as the sum of elements in the ranges of the various injections. Now for any i k , let kk be a bilattice homomorphism from B to the image of F under i k such that kk is the identity function on this image. Such bilattice homomorphisms always exist, since they exist on F S . We now de ne mappings s k from B into F by s k (x) = i ?1 k kk (x)]: Now if we de ne projections jk by jk = i j s k ; it is clear that the collection of jk can be used in (26) instead of the projections de ned in (11) . Finally, it is clear that we can always produce a set S = fi k g of injections, simply by adding new injections to S until all of B is covered.
It remains to show that the fact that the L operator may return di erent results on B and on F will not have any impact on the values returned by the rewritten expression. To see this, note that each term in (26) only deals with a subset of B that is isomorphic to F, and that for any embedding of F into B, the e ective results of L on B and on F S will match. Proposition 5.2. The L operator is nondeductive. Proof. Unchanged from the proof of Proposition 4.1. Proposition A.1 Let (L;^; _) be a distributive lattice. Then if L is either nite or isomorphic to 2 S for some set S, any lattice homomorphism on L can be written in terms of^, _, constant functions and lattice projections (i.e., lattice homomorphisms that factor through the two-point lattice). Proof. The rst part of the proposition is clear. For the second, suppose that we say that an element x 2 B is t-grounded if x = x _ u, and that x is f-grounded if x = x^u. It is shown in 9] that any bilattice element can be expressed uniquely as the sum of t-grounded and f-grounded elements, and that this expression is x = (x _ u) + (x^u):
It is also shown that the sets of t-grounded or f-grounded points constitute a lattice with meet and join operations given by and + respectively. Since : maps these two lattices into one another, and^= on the lattice of t-grounded points, this proposition follows from Proposition A. Proof. If S is inconsistent, the result is immediate, so suppose otherwise. In this case, the models of S (including the semantic restrictions associated with the Kripke operators) are in natural correspondence with the models of S in the sense of De nition 5.6, and the result follows. Proof. Except for the presence of the L operator, the proof matches that of Theorem 5.10.
That the L operator is handled satisfactorily is a consequence of the fact that the de nition of stability requires that (Lp) = L (p) for all p. Proposition 6.4. Let be a truth assignment de ned on W that takes the value u outside of W. Then cl( ) and scl( ) agree on W.
Proof. Since only deals with standard logical connectives, the condition that a stable extension of be grounded is equivalent to the condition that k scl( ). This will be true if and only if we take to actually be the closure as given by (14) , and it follows that the two de nitions agree in this case. Proof. We prove this result by showing that the stable grounded extensions of S are in natural correspondence with the autoepistemic expansions of S. Speci cally, we will show that T is an autoepistemic expansion of S if and only if there is some stable grounded extension of S such that T = ?1 (t).
First, we know from Lemma 2.6 that we need consider only the truth assignments that avoid ?. In addition, we note that any stable truth assignment de ned on the four-point bilattice that avoids ? can be characterized in terms of the sentences that it maps to t, since it maps the negations of these sentences to f and all other sentences to u.
The condition that an extension of S be grounded is now that k scl( S + L ):
Since is stable and an extension of S , we have k S and k L , so that k S + L and therefore = scl( ) k scl( S + L ); and (27) becomes = scl( S + L ): But this is equivalent to Proof. The theorem follows fairly easily from the assertion that cl( j )(p) = cl( s(p) )(p) if j > s(p). If this were not the case, there must be some sentence q with j s(q) > s(p) such that q and p are logically related and, in fact such that p actually appears as an argument to a modal operator in q. If the top-level modal operator in q is deductive, then we would have s(p) = s(q), so it must be the case that q is nondeductive. For nondeductive q, it may well be the case that s(q) has a stable extension in which (p) 6 = s(p) (p); however, it is clear that any such extension will not be grounded. The argument is unchanged from the discussion at the beginning of Section 6.
